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Abstract
To date a dearth of data has made it difficult to evaluate the success of First
Nations casinos in Canada. This paper helps remedy this situation by presenting a
three-province overview (Ontario, Saskatchewan and Alberta) of First Nations gaming
models. Two key findings are offered that First Nations seeking gaming market entry and
provincial officials should genuinely consider. First, while each province has adopted a
unique approach to First Nations gaming policy they have each opted to direct substantial
revenues out of First Nations communities and into their own treasuries. Second, the
evidence suggests that larger gaming properties located nearby a significant market
provide more benefits versus smaller properties situated in more isolated areas. The
subsequent discussion elaborates each provincial model’s revenue generating power,
how the revenue in question is being allocated and its corresponding socio-economic
impact, whether increased problem gambling and crime have resulted as predicted, while
exploring employment trends to determine whether they have developed as anticipated.
Introduction
Evaluating the impact of First Nations casinos in Canada has been hampered
by a lack of data (cf Cornell, 2008).2 First Nations leaders in several provinces are
nevertheless considering investing in reserve casino expansion. There are currently 17
First Nations casinos operating nationally in B.C. (1), Alberta (5), Saskatchewan (6),
Manitoba (2) and Ontario (1 for profit; 2 charity). Initially touted as revenue generators
that would employ large numbers of Aboriginal employees thus increasing community
benefits, provincial premiers in Ontario, Saskatchewan and Alberta echoed the First
Nation leadership’s positive testimonials to likewise champion reserve casino expansion
as a means of improving local First Nations development potential and well-being.
Each provincial government chose, however, to execute policies prescribing revenue
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distribution formulas, restrictions on casino site construction, while most importantly
directing casino revenues purportedly earmarked for First Nations communities into
provincial treasuries. Despite these setbacks, First Nations leaders in each province
remain confident in the reserve casino’s potential. Aside from assenting, anecdotal
declarations, modest efforts have been directed at exploring each model’s exigencies
in comparative perspective. This paper represents the first multi-province evaluation of
First Nations casinos in Canada and assesses the Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Alberta
First Nations gaming models to determine whether First Nations casinos are providing
maximum benefits.3 In particular, the following discussion evaluates the three provincial
gaming models’ revenue generating power, how the revenue is being allocated and its
corresponding socio-economic impact, whether increased problem gambling and crime
have resulted as projected, while exploring employment trends to determine their impact.
This paper unfolds as follows. After a literature review an overview of each provincial
First Nations gaming policy is provided followed by a quantitative analysis exploring the
aforementioned subjects, and the conclusions.
Literature Review
United States Indian nations started utilizing reservation casinos as an economic
stimulus in the 1980s. Described as “islands of poverty in a sea of wealth” (Anderson
& Parker, 2008, p. 641), as one researcher has noted, reservation communities “[w]ith
little or no economy or tax base to fund essential services … turned to gaming, through
self-determination, to generate government revenue needed to fund these services and
provide employment for tribal members” (Schaap, 2010, p. 381). By 2002, over half of
all tribal members living in the contiguous 48 states belonged to casino-operating tribes
(Evans & Topoleski, 2003) and, in 2008, Indian gaming revenues topped $26.7 billion
with 233 Indian tribes operating 411 casinos, bingo halls, and pull-tab operations in 28
states (NIGA, 2009). Dating to 1996, Canada’s First Nations’ gaming industry is by
comparison diminutive in scope, with 15 for profit and two charitable casinos operating
nationally that generate an estimated $1 billion annual gross revenues. Accordingly,
a large proportion of the research literature on casino gambling concerns its effect on
US reservations (Williams, Belanger, & Arthur, 2011). Recent studies have, however,
improved our collective understanding of these Canadian phenomena (Belanger, 2006,
2011b; Manitowabi, 2007; Williams, Belanger, et al., 2011). Even so, it is difficult to
generalize about gambling’s inter-jurisdictional impacts for they vary as a function of
pre-existing availability and exposure to gambling, the gamblers’ patronage origin, how
gambling revenue is distributed, and baseline levels of community impoverishment
(Williams, Rehm, & Stevens 2011). Therefore, evaluating the US Indian gaming industry
in part offers a comparative context and the baseline for further analyses.
Similar to American Indian gaming research, Canadian First Nations gaming
research tends to emphasize the economic and sovereign/self-government aspects of
casino operations, and gambling-related health and well-being issues. The spotlight
on sovereignty and the associated economic development issues is arguably due to
three factors. One, American Indian reservations are Congressionally empowered to
manage internal economic development, which the Harvard Project on American Indian
Economic Development (2008) heralds as a key foundation of augmented American
Indian self-determination. Two, gaming tribes since the 1980s have been forced to
confront State resistance to negotiating Congress-stipulated tribal gaming compacts
(Cattelino, 2008; Fenelon, 2006; Goldberg & Champagne, 2002; Light & Rand,
2005; Rand & Light, 2001; Spilde, 1998). Third, and most importantly, First Nations
leaders adopted the American Indian position that operating casinos was a sovereign
right (Belanger, 2006; Belanger & Williams, 2012b; Lazarus, Monzon, & Wodnicki,
2006). American Indian and First Nations gaming is therefore heralded as a beacon of
3

The casino operations in B.C. and Manitoba were left out of this analysis due to their small size and because the data sets
generated remain at this stage incomplete. Nova Scotia was left out due to the fact that no stand alone casinos are operation.
Rather, the First Nations manage and operate 582 VLTs at a variety of provincial sites dubiously identified ‘VLT Palaces’.
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Indian sovereignty (Gaughen, 2011; Hansen & Skopek, 2011), whereas Congressional
demands for state-American Indian compacts are criticized as an intolerable imposition
compromising American Indians’ inherent sovereignty (Ackerman, 2009; Light & Rand,
2005; Mezey, 1996; Schaap, 2010; Skopek & Hansen, 2011). Perhaps as troubling is
the fact that gaming tribes have little to no recourse in instances where states desire to
renegotiate the compacts (Light & Rand, 2005) (Rand 2007; Rausch 2007); or when
the provinces refuse First Nations a substantial consultative role during gaming policy
development (Belanger & Williams, 2012b).
That we remain largely uninformed about how provincial gaming policies impact
First Nations communities and their host provinces is problematic for these policies do
notably guide casino operations, highlighting the direct provincial influence upon First
Nations economic development (Belanger, Williams, & Arthur, 2012a; Nilson, 2004;
Williams, Belanger, et al., 2011). In addition to undermining indigenous sovereignty
by allowing the provinces to legislatively penetrate what were previously exclusively
federal domains, the provinces hosting First Nations casinos took questionable
advantage of economically impoverished First Nations’ willingness to accept restrictive
provincial policies in their zeal to access gambling revenues (e.g., Belanger & Williams,
2012b). Similar trends are evident in the US, where similarly ad-hoc revenue distribution
policies were established that also failed to acknowledge vital spatial characteristics
(Foley, 2005; Light, Rand, & Meister, 2004). As a result, despite the fact that hundreds
of tribes operate hundreds of casinos, gambling wealth remains concentrated in the
hands of a relatively small number of American Indian tribes representing a minority of
the overall Indian population (Cornell, 2008; Kalt, 2002).
Kelley (2001) warned Canadian officials of the inherent risks of relying on similar
policy models while emphasizing the need to “develop a sound policy framework that
will address current concerns [i.e., revenue distribution, problem gambling] before they
develop into future problems.” He added that policymakers “have an advantage in that
the experiences of tribal gambling throughout the US over the past two decades can act
as an important reference for developing a policy framework for First Nations casinos.”
It appears that these warnings were generally ignored, even if Canadian provinces
demand as a condition of licensing revenue sharing amongst gaming and non-gaming
First Nations as a means of ensuring most First Nations have access to a portion of the
revenues (Belanger, 2006). Less encouraging are provincial and state demands that
First Nations transfer a percentage of their gaming revenues into state and provincial
treasuries (Belanger & Williams, 2012b; Rand & Light, 2006).
Despite these and similar policy failings, it is evident that casino-related economic
benefits have not evaded all First Nations and reservations. Several studies point to
casino-related increased infrastructure values (Anders, 1996; Farrigan, 2005; Ha &
Ullmer, 2007; Snyder, 1999; J. B. Taylor & Kalt, 2005); and benefits for other nongambling businesses and state economies (Andrews, 2007; Evans & Topoleski, 2003;
W. S. Taylor, 2001). However, the economic boon anticipated by the majority of First
Nations and American Indian communities hosting casinos has failed to materialize
(Belanger, 2011b; Kayseas, Schneider, & Goodpipe, 2010). In instances where revenue
distribution models are in place, the majority of communities hosting casinos have
also been shown to profit disproportionately over non-host communities (Belanger &
Williams, 2012a; Cornell, 2008; J. B. Taylor & Kalt, 2005). For example, substantial
improvements have been identified in Arizona and New Mexico’s gaming reservations
compared to non-gaming communities (Gonzales, Lyson, & Mauser, 2007; Jojola &
Ong, 2006). Notable unemployment reductions in host reservations have been noted
(Murray 1993; Cozzetto 1995; Cornell et al. 1998) as have noteworthy employment and
income gains (Anders, 1996; Conner & Taggert, 2009; Cozzetto, 1995; d’Hauteserre,
1998; Evans & Topoleski, 2003; Fenelon, 2006; Gonzales, 2003; Kim, 2006; Ninokawa,
2002; Reagan & Gitter, 2007; Spilde, Taylor, & Grant, 2003; Topoleski, 2003; Wenz,
2006). Evident revenue distribution disparities resulting from poorly-constructed
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provincial and state gaming policies that tend to undermine indigenous sovereignty
and development opportunities have not stopped several scholars from concluding that
American Indian and First Nations gaming’s positives at this stage outweigh the negatives
(Cornell, 2008; Schaap, 2010; Williams, Belanger, et al., 2011). This by and large echoes
Thompson’s (1994) enthusiastic declaration about the Indian casino industry’s promise
for both the US and Canada (see also Chenault, 2000):
Indian gaming is the future for Native tribes’ survival and liberation from
the federal governments of the United States and Canada. Without this liberation
and autonomy, tribal sovereignty will never become a reality and North
American Indians will remain trapped in a cycle of poverty and despair due to
the lack of financial support necessary to educate, rehabilitate, and stimulate
growth in Indian Country. (Thompson, 1994, pp. 533-534)
As Cornell (2008, 64) laments, however, “it is difficult to know, comprehensively
and in detail, how much money Indian nations are making from gaming, what exactly
they are doing with the money they make, or what its social and economic impacts
are.” For example, US Indian casinos located next to large cities are economically quite
successful, whereas the geographically removed enterprises typically realize modest
returns, trends that are becoming more evident in Canada (Belanger, 2006). One needs
to question why state and provincial governments have developed policies that fail to
consider these and similar geographic disparities (Belanger, Williams & Arthur, 2012b).
The following analysis of the three provincial First Nations casino models—Ontario,
Saskatchewan and Alberta—speaks to several of these issues; shows us how much
revenue is being generated and thus directed to First Nations; while helping us to better
comprehend how a policy enacted for the benefit of First Nations in three provinces
operates, and the political response (or lack thereof) to unanticipated challenges.
First Nation’s gaming expansion in ON, SK & AB
State-sanctioned gaming on a reserve is deemed acceptable, but to operate outside of
legislative strictures is to defy provincial jurisdiction and risk Criminal Code of Canada
charges. This has not stopped First Nations leaders from contending that reserve gaming
operations are shielded from provincial laws by virtue of Section 91(24) of the British
North America Act of 1867, which recognizes Canada’s sole responsibility for “Indians,
and Lands reserved for the Indians.” Asked to resolve this question, the Supreme Court
of Canada in R. v. Pamajewon in 1996 determined that the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake
First Nations in Ontario did not possess an Aboriginal right to control and regulate
casino gaming in their reserve communities. The Court determined that the litigants
failed to demonstrate gaming’s centrality to Ojibwa culture or its practice as connected
to “the self-identity and self-preservation of the aboriginal societies involved here” (R.
v. Pamajewon, 1996). Concluding that gaming was not an Aboriginal right, the Supreme
Court determined that on-reserve gambling facilities were not exempt from provincial
legislation regulating gaming. As a result each province may devise its own regulatory
framework for First Nations casinos. In turn sui generis policy environments and on
the ground gambling industries have emerged that demonstrate unique similarities and
differences. The following discussion elaborates these similarities and differences while
establishing the key policy markers guiding the evolution of First Nations gaming in each
province.
Ontario
In 1992, in response to discussion with Ontario First Nations leaders, Premier Bob
Rae (NDP) announced his intention to open a reserve casino. By February 1994, fourteen
provincial First Nations had their sights set on hosting the casino that would, according
to provincial officials, distribute profits to the province’s First Nations through a First
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Nations fund. On 5 December 1994, Premier Rae announced that the Mnjikaning First
Nation had been selected as the site. CasinoRama would be situated on First Nations
land—the Mnjikaning reserve—and would be run by an established corporation during
its first ten years of operations. A request for proposals stipulated that the operator’s
costs prior to construction would include the construction of a recreational facility, a
senior’s home, and the establishment of a trust fund to develop a gambling addictions
program. The Mnjikaning proposal was considered the most attractive for a number of
reasons, the most important being the revenue-sharing formula, which would see 65%
of net revenues divided among the province’s 133 First Nations. The remaining 35%
would stay with the Mnjikaning First Nation to deal with increased traffic’s impact on
reserve infrastructure and to ensure programs for problem gaming in the community
were funded. Following the announced opening date, the Progressive Conservatives
(PC) defeated the NDP and immediately imposed a 20% Win Tax on Casino Rama
gross revenues.
Saskatchewan
In 1993, the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN), the provincial
Indian political representative body, approached Premier Roy Romanow (NDP)
to discuss reserve casino construction. From the premier’s perspective, the FSIN’s
inability to speak on behalf of the majority of the province’s First Nations, tribal
councils, and individual band councils rendered the organization less than effective.
Negotiations, nevertheless, proceeded and in 1995 the Gaming Framework Agreement
(GFA) and the Casino Operating Agreement (COA) were implemented. The
Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA) was established as a First Nationoperated oversight agent. At the GFA’s center was the revenue-sharing formula,
including a set of guidelines delineating how the revenues were to be spent by recipient
First Nations. Specifically, the provincial government would receive 37.5% of net
revenues, 37.5% would go to the First Nations Trust for community distribution in the
form of social programs, economic development and infrastructure development and
upgrades, whereas the residual 25% would be allocated to four provincial Community
Development Corporations (CDC). Each CDC was created to aid in distributing
one-quarter of the net profit share pursuant to the Framework Agreement in an effort
to: (1) stimulate First Nations economic development; (2) fund reserve justice and
health initiatives; (3) finance reserve education and cultural development; (4) improve
community infrastructure; and (5) develop senior and youth programs and other
charitable purposes. Each CDC was recognized as a corporate body with a board of
directors (Nilson, 2004). The Saskatchewan government, in 2007, lowered its share
of First Nations gaming revenues from 37.5% to 25% while raising the overall First
Nations share of profits to 75%. The revised revenue sharing agreement has led to
improved First Nations development, which is directly attributable to an infusion of
gaming revenues. As of 2013-2014, SIGA is successfully operating six casinos.
Alberta
In 1993, the Tsuu T’ina First Nation (southwest of Calgary) and the Enoch Cree
First Nation (west of Edmonton) were awarded licenses to hold super-bingos that
guaranteed jackpots exceeding $10,000. That year, the Tsuu T’ina turned a $100,000
profit, which led to immediate calls from provincial First Nations leaders to create
an independent First Nations Gaming Commission (Stewart 1993). First Nations
leaders advocated for a policy model ensuring all bands would benefit equally from
any reserve casino developments. As early as 1996, a plan was tabled that would have
allocated 10% of First Nation casino profits to a fund benefitting the province’s First
Nations, while the First Nation, or the management company running the casino,
would receive 50% of the profits. Alberta’s licensed charities would receive the
remaining 40% (Williams, Belanger, et al., 2011). First Nations balked at the proposal.
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In September 2000, Premier Ralph Klein (PC) proposed a new policy that would allocate
all reserve casino profits to the provincial First Nations and, in December, he announced
his support. First Nations were pleased and, one month later, on January 21, 2001, the
FNGP was ratified. It did contain one unanticipated modification: a proviso directing
30% of all First Nations casinos’ slot machine revenues to the Alberta Lottery Fund for
provincial charitable use (Belanger & Williams, 2012b). Without publicly acknowledging
the 30% proviso’s inclusion, the FNGP, provincial officials claimed, would afford First
Nations the opportunity “to support economic, social and community development
projects as well as use charitable gaming proceeds for initiatives such as infrastructure
and life skills training” (Belanger, Williams, & Arthur, 2011).
Table 1
Key Provisions of Each Provincial First Nations Casino Policy

Outside Casino Operator
Required
Revenue Sharing Agreement
Provincial Fee from Casino
Revenues
Casinos Licensed as Charities
Provincially-prescribed Use of
Casino Revenues
Problem Gambling Funding
Allocated
Ad hoc approach to policy
evident

Ontario
*

Saskatchewan

Alberta
*

*
*

*
*

*
*
*

*

*
*

*

*

*

*

In each case the provinces leveraged their Criminal Code of Canada-assigned
authority to approve casino licenses and fashion First Nations gaming policies reflecting
provincial desires. From a provincial perspective, reserve casinos were never considered
products of, nor did they represent elements of Aboriginal self-government. As Belanger
and Williams (2012) have argued in the Alberta context, which appears to extend to
Ontario and Saskatchewan, each provincial government has exploited its Criminal Code
authority by demanding concessions and, thus, prescribing negotiated outcomes much to
the annoyance of First Nations’ battling for recognition of what they argue is an inherent
Aboriginal right to control reserve gaming (see also Belanger, 2006, 2011a; Manitowabi,
2011). Certain provisions permitted each province to dictate through internal oversight
policies how First Nations could spend their revenues as well as the guidelines to
releasing the provincially held casino revenues. Alberta and Ontario demanded outside
casino operators be brought in whereas Saskatchewan permitted the FSIN to establish
SIGA for those purposes. As the above discussion illustrates, despite being negotiated
independently of one another, the provincial policies, when compared, are operationally
similar (see Table 1). The policies were established to ensure provincial oversight for
First Nations casino operations, spending, and provincial development through imposed
contributions to provincial coffers. These actions guaranteed that the provinces retained
centralized authority for regulating First Nation casino operations while simultaneously
restricting First Nations economic and political agency. Each provincial approach
innovatively enabled their respective gaming bureaucracy’s expansion during a period of
economic reforms by assigning to First Nations annual fees for the privilege of operating
casinos.
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Methodology
The first step in a socioeconomic impact analysis of gambling is to document
how much money is actually being expended, received, and disbursed, as this serves
as a rough guide of the potential magnitude of these impacts, especially the economic
ones. This data was compiled from the following sources. For Alberta they were:
Alberta Gaming and Liquor Commission (AGLC) annual reports and the Alberta
Lottery Fund website, which lists the details of all First Nations Development Fund
(FNDF) disbursements; FNDF revenues and their utilization were obtained from the
AGLC’s public website, Alberta Lottery Fund: Who Benefits. The primary source
from Ontario was the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation (OLG) annual reports.
For Saskatchewan the annual reports of the Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority
(SIGA), the Indigenous Gaming Regulators (IGR), and the First Nations Trust (FNT)
were utilized. Where applicable and verifiable chief and council members’ perspectives
obtained from transmitted and/or printed speeches, interviews, and testimonials and,
where available, community newsletters are used to provide context. First, newspaper
and electronic media sources (e.g., radio and television news reports, YouTube) were
reviewed for relevant information regarding community-based projections for each
project. In each case, multiple newspaper sources were employed to confirm the data.
For referencing, the publication in which the data was first printed was selected. Third,
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) data detailing band council budgets and
expenditures were utilized. In sum, the various data sources provide the baseline data
needed to evaluate the respective casinos’ impacts.
Analysis
The following sections are distilled from the data gleaned from the aforementioned
reports and websites. As Figure 1 shows, Ontario appears to be the leader both in terms
of gross and net First Nations gaming revenues generated for the period 2006-2010. The
following sections elaborate on these trends in more detail.
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generating power: in terms of gross revenues generated Ontario at $1.39 billion,
outpaces Alberta and Saskatchewan, which produced similar gross annual revenues
($773 to $725 million).
Table 2
Gross Revenues, 2006-2011
2006-2007

2007-2008

2008-2009

2009-2010

2010-2011

Total

Ontario

$515,000,000

$499,000,000

$488,000,000

$467,500,000

$434,965,000

$2,404,465,000

Saskatchewan

$130,337,810

$190,965,435

$226,765,170

$238,746,929

$259,821,502

$1,046,636,846

Alberta

$33,745,555

$141,022,473

$253,835,015

$262,086,233

$257,050,973

$947,740,248

These revenue figures are a good starting point but do not provide a definitive
picture. Measuring the net revenues generated in each province offers a better
assessment. For instance, between 2006 and 2011 Ontario generated the highest level of
net revenues followed by Alberta and Saskatchewan. When we factor in the anticipated
annual revenue production reflective of the last three years of full functionality in
Alberta the latter closes the gap earning $309 million compared to Ontario at roughly
$380 million and Saskatchewan at more than $207 million.
Table 3
Net Revenue, 2006-2011
2006-2007

2007-2008

2008-2009

2009-2010

2010-2011

Total

Ontario1

$140,595,000

$136,227,000

$133,224,000

$127,627,500

$118,745,445

$656,418,945

Saskatchewan

$48,836,918

$61,106,749

$67,220,171

$60,240,739

$64,094,171

$301,498,748

Alberta

$13,498,222

$56,408,989

$101,534,006

$104,834,493

$102,820,389

$379,096,099

It is apparent that each provincial First Nations casino industry has generally
achieved a revenue plateau. As Table 3 demonstrates after four consecutive years of
rising net revenues Alberta experienced a 1.9% drop in net revenue in 2010-2011.
While Saskatchewan rebounded by 6.4% after experiencing its first drop in net revenues
following several consecutive years of growth. Ontario has witnessed a steady 15.5%
decline during the study period. These general outcomes tend to echo each province’s
economic trends during the study period. For example, simultaneous to Alberta’s
economic expansion Ontario experienced a decline as Saskatchewan generally
maintained economic equilibrium (substantial provincial economic growth began in
2011). This levelling off and drop in gross revenues in the two largest jurisdictions may
also point to drops in gambling participation rates due to exposure (e.g., Shaffer, LaBrie,
& LaPlante, 2004). Evidence from Alberta demonstrated that with time gambling
participation rates drop because the novelty has worn off, and due to population
familiarity with the product (Williams, Belanger, et al., 2011).
In terms of absolute revenue generating clout Ontario substantially outpaces both
Alberta and Saskatchewan. Things change, however, when we measure the net revenues
generated in each province: Ontario just slightly outpaces Alberta in this regard while
drastically outperforming Saskatchewan. For now we can basically conclude that the
Saskatchewan approach reliant on a operating a number of smaller to middling sized
casinos is the least economically successful model.
Community Revenue Allocations
In each case the provinces agreed to negotiate First Nations casinos into existence for
the purposes of offsetting socio-economic difficulties confronting all reserve communities.
It is consequently incumbent to determine the First Nations’ casinos general impact by
1

The Ontario figures are based on figures reported by the Canadian Press (CP) indicating that Casino Rama realized a $1.5
billion profit on roughly $5.5 billion in revenues from 1996-2010, which amounted to a 27.3% profit margin (see Perkel,
2011). The yearly figures provided are based on this percentage. These totals do not include the slots revenue generated at
the Lake Scugog charity casino, which, during this period, produced on average roughly $4.6 million annually.
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assessing the average amount of revenue assigned to the benefactor communities, and
how this revenue is generally being utilized. According to the 2006 Canada Census, which
occurred at the beginning of the study period, there were 133 First Nations in Ontario, 70 in
Saskatchewan and 45 in Alberta. Each of these communities is included in their respective
provincial-First Nations revenue-sharing agreement. Reflecting on the last three years of
the study period (dating to 2008), Alberta directed an annual average of $2.34 million to the
provincial First Nations followed by Ontario ($951,371) and Saskatchewan ($912,167).
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others (Belanger, Williams, & Arthur, 2012b).

Table 4
Table 4Revenue Variance, Alberta & Saskatchewan, 2006-2010
Regional

Regional Revenue Variance,
Alberta &2007Saskatchewan,
20062008-2006-2010
2009-

Overall
2006-2007
2007-2008
2008-2009
2009-2010
Overall
2007
2008
2009
2010
North
AB
28.9%
11.3%
7.9%
7.4%
8.4%
North
AB SK 28.9%37.2% 11.3% 38%7.9% 37.5%
7.4%
8.4%
37.5%
37.6%
Central
30.3%
SK AB 37.2%49.8% 38% 75.8%
37.5% 21.1%
37.5% 21.4%
37.6%
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31.5%
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21.4% 71.3%
30.3%
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SK SK 31.4%31.5% 31.8% 30.2%
31.4% 31.1%
31.2% 31.2%
31.5%
31%
South
AB
21.3%
13%
71%
71.3%
61.3%
A quick word on regional variance is required for Northern First Nations communities in
SK
31.5%
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31.1%
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each of the three provinces experience unique challenges. They tend to be isolated communities
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supplement provincial First Nations budgets by an average of 12.23% led by Ontario
at 17.2%, followed by Alberta (11.67%), then Saskatchewan (3.84%). The revenues
in questions are directed to the communities in the form of social programs, economic
development projects, and infrastructure development and enhancement. The variances
in the per capita percentage of revenues received is a product of net revenues identified
below in Table 5 in relation to the provincial First Nations populations—federal funding
formulas, while not universal or static, are nevertheless similar for each community.
Table 5
Casino Contributions to Host First Nations as a Percentage Above Federal Payments

Federal
Contribution

Casino/
Gambling
Revenues

Gambling Revenue
as % of Federal
Contribution

Ontario
Totals (2006-2011)
Yearly Average

$3,816,351,659 $656,418,945
$763,270,332 $131,283,789

17.2%
17.2%

Saskatchewan
Totals (2003-2008)
Yearly Average

2

$2,046,850,503
$409,370,101

$78,546,267
$15,709,253

3.84%
3.84%

$3,212,438,900 $374,867,594
$642,487,780
$74,973,519

11.67%
11.67%

Alberta
Totals (2006-2011)
Yearly Average
Totals (average)

$605,042,738

$73,988,854

12.23%

The provincial-First Nations funding formulas in Ontario and Alberta have come under
fire due to several evident inequities. In Ontario, the Mnjikaning First Nations was initially
entitled to keep 35% of CasinoRama’s profits for hosting the casino. This led to a lawsuit
filed by the Ontario First Nation chiefs seeking more equitable distribution. The 35% was
held in trust until 2008, when the chiefs agreed to forsake their rights to the 35% revenues
in exchange for $201 million and a 1.7% cut of Ontario provincial gaming revenues. The
deal is expected to provide the 133 First Nations $120 million annually, which doubled
their current take under the original agreement (Canadian Press, 2010). In Alberta,
Enoch’s FNDF disbursement of $35 million in 2008/2009 was 303% more than its INAC’s
budgetary allocation. Similarly Tsuu T’ina received more than $28 million, which was 142%
more than its INAC budget. Despite lower than expected returns, gambling revenues also
contribute noticeably to two other host First Nations’—Alexis Nakota Sioux Nation and the
Cold Lake First Nations—overall budgets. FNDF funding in total represented 83.3% of the
4 communities’ collective allocation. Not surprisingly, the percentage of revenue accounted
for by the FNDF was much less for non-host communities (Belanger & Williams, 2012a).
The host community benefits in Saskatchewan are confined to wages plus benefits earned
by the Aboriginal employees that make up 65% of the SIGA workforce; and in the form of
external discretionary spending by gamblers visiting the First Nations.
Problem Gambling & Crime
Concerns have frequently been raised concerning the negative impact of introducing
casinos to First Nations communities, the most common being the anticipated rise in
problem and pathological gambling. Writing in 2011, journalist Tasha Kheiriddin stated
2

At the time of the initial analysis for this paper First Nations profiles for Saskatchewan were only available to the year
2008.
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that constructing reserve casinos would not be able to overcome the federal, provincial
and First Nation political inability to properly respond to among other issues health
problems. Existing research does not support such grandiloquent claims. In Alberta,
the only province where research exists exploring the impact of introducing casinos to
First Nations communities illustrates that in three of the four communities for which
data are available the difference in problem and pathological gambling rates between
2008 and 2009 were not statistically significant (Williams, Belanger, et al., 2011). The
number of problem gamblers at the Stoney Nakoda Nation did increase by a factor of
3.8 from 2008 to 2009. Consistent with earlier research, First Nation prevalence rates
are notably and consistently higher than the general population prevalence rates across
Alberta (Wardman, el-Guebaly, & Hodgins, 2001; Williams, Stevens, & Nixon, 2011). Yet
there is some evidence of decreased rates of First Nations problem gambling since 2000,
coincident with the same trend that may be occurring in the general population (Williams,
Belanger, et al., 2011). This despite significant increases in gambling availability and
general population per capita expenditure during this time period. Once again we can
point to drops in gambling participation rates due to exposure (e.g., Shaffer, LaBrie, &
LaPlante, 2004) because the novelty has worn off (Williams, Belanger, et al., 2011). It is
duly noted that these rates reflect Aboriginal population trends across Alberta, rather than
Aboriginal populations in the immediate proximity of the five new First Nations casinos.
Clearly additional work is needed, but findings to date do not support Kheiriddin’s dire
predictions.
The same can be said for casino-related crime rates, where once again our
understanding of the trends is restricted to Alberta. With the exception of the Enoch
First Nation, none of Alberta’s host First Nations or community officials could confirm a
post-casino increase in crime (see also Arthur, Williams, & Belanger, 2014). The highest
profile criminal activity occurred following the River Cree Casino and Resort’s opening,
where Native as well as Jamaican and Asian gangs from Edmonton were vying for both
on- and off-reserve territorial control. The River Cree Casino Club also served alcohol
drawing younger patrons, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) frequently
responded to service calls that were assault- and alcohol-related. Of all the issues
identified by the police, government officials and casino operators money laundering
is considered to be the most problematic. According to RCMP officials, various gangs
purchase chips with high value bills. After gambling minimally for a half hour, they cash
the chips, thus effectively laundering the money. An 8-member RCMP squad responsible
for providing casino and reserve policing has worked closely with the Enoch Cree Nation
to mitigate local criminal activity. Crime rates are now down due to an enhanced RCMP
presence on reserve. An RCMP official responsible for patrolling the Stoney casino
reported that the minimal casino calls (accounting for only 25% of each officer’s time),
enables officers to devote additional resources to combating the local drug trade, domestic
abuse, assaults, and mischief. Enhanced policing at Stoney has also led to greater policecommunity relations (Williams, Belanger, et al., 2011).
Employment and Income
First Nations leaders in each province early on extolled the virtues of reserve casinos,
potential employment being the most significant. In short, casinos would both produce
revenues for distribution to all provincial First Nations and Aboriginal individuals would
be employed. In 1995, Casino Rama Project chairman Ted Williams predicted the casino
would generate between upwards of $400 million a year and employ 1,300 people
(Walker, 1995, p. B2), a number that one month later had jumped to 2,200 employees.
When the doors opened in July 1996 the workforce stood at 2,600 roughly 620 of which
were Aboriginal (Ferguson, 1996, p. A4). Those numbers remained relatively stable
through 1999, when it was reported that Casino Rama employed 487 people from 55
provincial First Nations, which made up 20% of the workforce (Marowits, 1999, p. A4), a
total that peaked in 2003 at 750 Aboriginal employees. As of 2011 CasinoRama employed
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450 Aboriginal people, which at the time represented 14.8% (3,040) of the casino
workforce. Using $30,000 per employee as the average wage we estimate that roughly
$22.5 million is earned by Aboriginal employees. In Alberta original estimates suggested
that the five First Nations casinos would employ 1,340 people with an annual payroll of
$37.8 million while acknowledging that a shortage of casino professionals and a limited
Aboriginal labor pool would require that non-Native employees also be hired. In fiscal
2009/2010 the five First Nations’ casinos had a total 1,030 employees and the total
number of employees and total payroll fell below initial expectations. In total, current
employee numbers represents 78% of initial projections, whereas the $31,025,000
payroll represents 82% of original projections. A significant percentage of the five First
Nation casino charities employ First Nations people. Out of the approximately 170
employees, 90% (155) are believed to be First Nations with a total estimated payroll
$3.4 million, with the First Nations themselves retaining $3.1 million of these wages
(Williams, Belanger, et al., 2011). Saskatchewan by far has made the most impressive
strides as concerns casino Aboriginal employment where roughly 1,200 Aboriginal
employees make up 64% of the workforce and in 2010 generated more than $51 million
in Aboriginal wages plus benefits.
Table 6
First Nations Casino Aboriginal Employees/Wages + Benefits

Ontario
Saskatchewan
Alberta

Number of
Employees,
2010

Aboriginal
Employees,
2010

Annual Gross
Aboriginal
Wages +
Benefits in
2010

Gross
Aboriginal
Wages +
Benefits,
2006-2011

5,068
1,900
1,030

750
1,235
206

$22,500,000
$51,438,609
$6,205,000

$137,250,000
$208,256,563

n/a

Table 6 demonstrates the cumulative effect of these wages. A review of the SIGA’s
annual reports, for instance, demonstrates that between 2006 and 2011 Aboriginal
employees earned $208,256,563 of the $320,800,014 paid out in total wages and benefits,
which amounts to roughly 65%. During the same period CasinoRama’s Aboriginal
employees earned $137,250,000 (data was not available for Alberta). While not all of
these dollars remain in Aboriginal communities they do represent value added when
factoring in the casino revenues that enter the community in the form of programs and
added infrastructure. Measuring the impact of wages versus infrastructure and program
investment is difficult. Whereas wages would have better immediate impact because
they would quickly be spent on products and services (albeit from outside of Aboriginal
communities boasting limited infrastructure and localized business) ultimately this
money is lost to the local economy. Creating infrastructure that would enhance local
spending would have better long-term value in terms of helping to establish community
equilibrium from social, political and economic perspectives. We can conclude that if
you are looking to build an economy from the ground up, which is the case for many of
the First Nations gaming beneficiaries, public investments are the most effective means.
The impact of personal spending power cannot however be understated.
Of note, employment figures for each First Nations community in each province
are not available, making it impossible to determine how casino openings affected local
employment trends. Statistics Canada and Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC)
utilize Canadian census data, the latest year being 2011. Hindering our analysis is the fact
that many First Nations in this study cite an inherent right to self-government to restrict
Canadian surveyors from entering their communities. Thus their online community
profiles lack vital data for employment, annual earnings, work force characteristics,
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or even gender and age. Considering that we are unable to generate data sets for some
of the larger gaming First Nations (Enoch and Tsuu T’ina in Alberta among them), and
benefit significantly from the projects, the lack of complete (or any) data sets hinders our
analysis. The above discussion at the very least provides the baseline data from which
future analyses may be developed.
Provincial Benefits
The most contentious element of the provincial-First Nations gaming agreements is
the provision directing a portion of revenues earned in First Nations casinos to provincial
treasuries. But what are the overall costs to the First Nations benefitting from a process
presumably intended to provide communities with what Alberta officials described as the
“means to support economic, social and community development projects as well as use
charitable gaming proceeds for initiatives such as infrastructure and life skills training”?
Table 7 shows that during the study period 30% of Alberta and 25% of Saskatchewan
First Nations net gaming revenues were directed to their respective provincial
governments.7 Ontario adopted a different strategy by applying a 20% WinTax on
CasinoRama’s gross revenues. On average the Ontario government takes in $96,178,600,
Alberta $56,864,415 (since all First Nations casinos became operational this total has
risen to $77 million annually) and Saskatchewan $5,441,410.
Table 7
Provincial Fees Drawn from First Nations Gaming Revenues8
Ontario

2006-2007

2007-2008

2008-2009

2009-2010

2010-2011

Total

$103,000,000

$99,800,000

$97,600,000

$93,500,000

$86,993,000

$480,893,000

Saskatchewan

$10,210,094

$5,252,187

$4,105,043

$2,368,185

$5,271,543

$27,207,052

Alberta

$10,123,667

$42,306,742

$76,150,505

$78,625,870

$77,115,292

$284,322,074

In all during the study period roughly $.75 billion was diverted from First Nations
development and into provincial coffers where the money has been used for provincial
development. First Nations casinos are in part driving provincial development—especially
in Ontario and Alberta—despite the fact that First Nations casinos were touted as means
to aid First Nations development. It would appear therefore that First Nations casinos
benefit Alberta and Ontario’s non-Native provincial citizens notably. Improvement in this
case is, of course, also dependent on Alberta releasing FNDF revenues, which are held in
trust until a First Nation satisfies provincial administrators’ spending practices guidelines;
and Ontario releasing money withheld until resolution of the several lawsuits involving
CasinoRama. Notably all three provinces release gaming revenues only once it has been
determined that they are to be spent according to provincially prescribed guidelines
intended to assist administrators in determining what is considered to be an appropriate
development venture. During the study period Alberta held back 13% of all charity
monies and a portion of FNDF funds, amounting to more than $13 million. These strict
spending provisions dictate that provincial regulators are depriving First Nations from
accessing revenue generated in First Nations casinos. Notably the provincial allocation
provides each province a safety net for reclaiming a portion of the gambling revenues
leaking from the provincial economy vis-à-vis non-Native gamblers into the micro First
Nations economy.
Conclusions
The above discussion contends that each provincial First Nations gaming model has
positive and negative elements and offers a series of important findings. Perhaps the most
significant is that First Nations casinos are not performing to maximum benefit, at least
as far as leaders of benefactor First Nations communities would recognize. Apart from
7
8

In 2007, the Saskatchewan government lowered its take of First Nations gaming revenues from 37.5% to 25% while raising
the First Nations take of profits to 75%.
The Saskatchewan data reflects the change in the provincial take on revenues between 2007-2008.

78

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal ♦ Volume 18 Issue 2

Are Canadian First Nations Casinos Providing Maximum Benefits?

Saskatchewan’s notable employment trends and the fact that no discernable post-casino
increases in problem gambling or casino-related crime are evident in the provincial First
Nations communities; or among its Aboriginal populations, two policy issues continue
to hinder the First Nation gaming industry’s economic potential. First, although each
province developed unique approaches to forging its specific gaming policy, each one
included a similar and key provision: they all opted to divert substantial gaming revenues
into their own treasuries and away from struggling First Nations communities. In total,
the First Nations in the three provinces during the study period were deprived of roughly
three-quarters of a billion dollars in gaming revenues that could have been directed to
local development and poverty reduction schemes. This exposes the reality that First
Nations casinos are prominently benefiting non-Aboriginal provincial citizens, which
challenges the spirit and intent of the provincial First Nations gaming policies.
The second policy-related issue concerns casino site prescriptions. In Ontario the
NDP government insisted that one central, reserve-based casino service all provincial
First Nations. Alberta and Saskatchewan adopted a dissimilar approach that permitted
multiple First Nations casino operations so long as they were constructed on a reserve.
This did and continues to inform economic outcomes in each province. In addition
to influencing employment trends, among other issues, the larger gaming properties
located nearby a significant market provide greater benefits compared to the smaller
casino properties sited in more isolated areas. Whereas in Saskatchewan the First
Nations gaming industry model is characterized by smaller, isolated First Nations
casino properties, Alberta chose to blend the latter with the use of large and centralized
casinos located near a significant market (see, for e.g., Eadington & Collins, 2009). In
Ontario, the First Nation casino was located in an adequate market and has performed
admirably even if the move did confine the industry to the provincial south-west while
also forestalling attempts at industry expansion. Similar site prescriptions considerably
compromised nine of the 11 prairie casinos profitability, consequently undermining
struggling provincial First Nations who envisioned gaming revenues as a means to
facilitate community development.
The policy deficiencies that continue to undercut the First Nations gaming industry’s
economic promise have resulted in a unique outcome that demands unpacking for
the benefit of First Nations seeking market entry, and to a lesser extent the provincial
officials assigned the responsibility for creating and implementing (equitable) First
Nations gaming policies. As the analysis loosely revealed, the destination integrated
resort has proven more lucrative in Alberta and Ontario, the latter of which offers what
appears to be a solid balance of development and employment potential. Ostensibly one
could argue that these discrepancies are attributable to the acknowledged differences
between the repeater market and the destination integrated resort models (Eadington
& Collins, 2009). We cannot however conclusively trace the provincial gaming policy
variances to any formal discussion about these models’ characteristics for these
conversations did not occur. Hence the provincial approaches to policy making were in
no way informed, and as such could not take into consideration these nuanced policy
debates. Until such time that additional research is produced specifically examining these
and like trends our ability to identify a best practice remains limited.
To be certain First Nations casinos appear to be working well albeit within the scope
of provincial policy prescriptions that have unduly restricted the industry’s participants,
which in turn has negatively influenced First Nations casinos’ economic development
potential. Further work exploring these impacts is warranted, as is provincial
reconsideration of the need to seize casino revenues for its own development purposes—
they should be redirected back into First Nations’ development, minus regulatory costs,
as the policy initially intended.
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